{"id":4346,"date":"2016-01-13T16:11:15","date_gmt":"2016-01-13T22:11:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/?p=4346"},"modified":"2016-01-13T16:11:15","modified_gmt":"2016-01-13T22:11:15","slug":"as-u-s-modernizes-nuclear-weapons-smaller-leaves-some-uneasy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/as-u-s-modernizes-nuclear-weapons-smaller-leaves-some-uneasy\/","title":{"rendered":"As U.S. Modernizes Nuclear Weapons, \u2018Smaller\u2019 Leaves Some Uneasy"},"content":{"rendered":"

By William J. Broad and David E. Sanger Jan. 11, 2016<\/span><\/p>\n

As North Korea dug tunnels at its nuclear test site last fall, watched by American spy satellites, the Obama administration was preparing a test of its own in the Nevada desert.<\/p>\n

A fighter jet took off with a mock version of the nation\u2019s first precision-guided atom bomb. Adapted from an older weapon, it was designed with problems like North Korea in mind: Its computer brain and four maneuverable fins let it zero in on deeply buried targets like testing tunnels and weapon sites. And its yield, the bomb\u2019s explosive force, can be dialed up or down depending on the target, to minimize collateral damage.<\/p>\n

In short, while the North Koreans have been thinking big \u2014 claiming to have built<\/a> a hydrogen bomb, a boast that experts dismiss<\/a> as wildly exaggerated \u2014 the Energy Department and the Pentagon have been readying a line of weapons that head in the opposite direction.<\/p>\n

The build-it-smaller approach has set off a philosophical clash among those in Washington who think about the unthinkable.<\/p>\n

Mr. Obama has long advocated a \u201cnuclear-free world.\u201d His lieutenants argue that modernizing existing weapons can produce a smaller and more reliable arsenal while making their use less likely because of the threat they can pose. The changes, they say, are improvements rather than wholesale redesigns, fulfilling the president\u2019s pledge to make no new nuclear arms<\/a>.<\/p>\n

But critics, including a number of former Obama administration officials, look at the same set of facts and see a very different future. The explosive innards of the revitalized weapons may not be entirely new, they argue, but the smaller yields and better targeting can make the arms more tempting to use \u2014 even to use first, rather than in retaliation.<\/p>\n

Gen. James E. Cartwright, a retired vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who was among Mr. Obama\u2019s most influential nuclear strategists, said he backed the upgrades because precise targeting allowed the United States to hold fewer weapons. But \u201cwhat going smaller does,\u201d he acknowledged, \u201cis to make the weapon more thinkable.\u201d<\/p>\n

\n

A More Accurate Atom Bomb<\/h2>\n

As Mr. Obama enters his final year in office, the debate has deep implications for military strategy, federal spending and his legacy.<\/p>\n

The B61 Model 12, the bomb flight-tested last year in Nevada, is the first of five new warhead types planned as part of an atomic revitalization estimated to cost up to $1 trillion over three decades. As a family, the weapons and their delivery systems move toward the small, the stealthy and the precise.<\/p>\n

Already there are hints of a new arms race. Russia called the B61 tests<\/a> \u201cirresponsible\u201d and \u201copenly provocative.\u201d China is said to be especially worried about plans for a nuclear-tipped cruise missile. And North Korea last week defended its pursuit of a hydrogen bomb<\/a> by describing the \u201cever-growing nuclear threat\u201d from the United States.<\/p>\n

The more immediate problem for the White House is that many of its alumni have raised questions about the modernization push and missed opportunities for arms control.<\/p>\n

\u201cIt\u2019s unaffordable and unneeded,\u201d said Andrew C. Weber, a former assistant secretary of defense and former director of the Nuclear Weapons Council, an interagency body that oversees the nation\u2019s arsenal.<\/p>\n

He cited in particular the advanced cruise missile, estimated to cost up to $30 billion for roughly 1,000 weapons.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe president has an opportunity to set the stage for a global ban on nuclear cruise missiles,\u201d Mr. Weber said in an interview. \u201cIt\u2019s a big deal in terms of reducing the risks of nuclear war.\u201d<\/p>\n

Last week, Brian P. McKeon, the principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy, argued that anyone who looks impartially at Mr. Obama\u2019s nuclear initiatives in total sees major progress toward the goals of a smaller force and a safer world \u2014 themes the White House highlighted on Monday in advance of the president\u2019s State of the Union address<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\u201cWe\u2019ve cleaned up loose nuclear material around the globe, and gotten the Iran deal,\u201d removing a potential threat for at least a decade, Mr. McKeon said.<\/p>\n

He acknowledged that other pledges \u2014 including treaties on nuclear testing and the production of bomb fuel \u2014 have been stuck, and that the president\u2019s hopes of winning further arms cuts in negotiations with Russia \u201cran into a blockade after the events in Ukraine.\u201d<\/p>\n

He specifically defended the arsenal\u2019s modernization, saying the new B61 bomb \u201ccreates more strategic stability.\u201d<\/p>\n

Early in his tenure, Mr. Obama invested much political capital not in upgrades but in reductions, becoming the first president to make nuclear disarmament a centerpiece of American defense policy.<\/p>\n

In Prague in 2009, he pledged in a landmark speech<\/a> that he would take concrete steps toward a nuclear-free world and \u201creduce the role of nuclear weapons<\/a> in our national security strategy.\u201d The Nobel committee cited the pledge that year in awarding him the Peace Prize.<\/p>\n

A modest arms reduction treaty with Russia seemed like a first step. Then, in 2010, the administration released a sweeping plan that Mr. Obama called a fulfillment of his atomic vow<\/a>. The United States, he declared, \u201cwill not develop new nuclear warheads or pursue new military missions or new capabilities.\u201d<\/p>\n

The overall plan<\/a> was to rearrange old components of nuclear arms into revitalized weapons. The resulting hybrids would be far more reliable, meaning the administration could argue that the nation would need fewer weapons in the far future.<\/p>\n

Inside the administration, some early enthusiasts for Mr. Obama\u2019s vision began to worry that it was being turned on its head.<\/p>\n

In late 2013, the first of the former insiders spoke out. Philip E. Coyle III and Steve Fetter, who had recently left national security posts, helped write an 80-page critique<\/a> of the nuclear plan by the Union of Concerned Scientists, a private group that made its name during the Cold War, arguing for arms reductions.<\/p>\n

American allies and adversaries, the report warned, may see the modernization \u201cas violating the administration\u2019s pledge not to develop or deploy\u201d new warheads. The report, which urged a more cautious approach, cited a finding by federal advisory scientists: that simply refurbishing weapons in their existing configurations could keep them in service for decades.<\/p>\n

\u201cI\u2019m not a pacifist,\u201d Mr. Coyle, a former head of Pentagon weapons testing, said in an interview. But the administration, he argued, was planning for too big an arsenal. \u201cThey got the math wrong in terms of how many weapons we need, how many varieties we need and whether we need a surge capacity\u201d for the crash production of nuclear arms.<\/p>\n

The insider critiques soon focused on individual weapons, starting with the B61 Model 12. The administration\u2019s plan was to merge four old B61 models into a single version that greatly reduced their range of destructive power. It would have a \u201cdial-a-yield\u201d feature whose lowest setting was only 2 percent as powerful as the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.<\/p>\n

The plan seemed reasonable, critics said, until attention fell on the bomb\u2019s new tail section and steerable fins. The Federation of American Scientists, a Washington research group, argued<\/a> that the high accuracy and low destructive settings meant military commanders might press to use the bomb in an attack, knowing the radioactive fallout and collateral damage would be limited.<\/p>\n

Last year, General Cartwright echoed that point<\/a> on PBS\u2019s \u201cNewsHour.\u201d He has huge credibility in nuclear circles: He was head of the United States Strategic Command, which has military authority over the nation\u2019s nuclear arms, before serving as vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<\/p>\n

In a recent interview in his office at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, General Cartwright said the overall modernization plan might change how military commanders looked at the risks of using nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n

\u201cWhat if I bring real precision to these weapons?\u201d he asked. \u201cDoes it make them more usable? It could be.\u201d<\/p>\n

Some of the biggest names in nuclear strategy see a specific danger in the next weapon in the modernization lineup: the new cruise missile, a \u201cstandoff weapon\u201d that bombers can launch far from their targets.<\/p>\n

\u201cMr. President, kill the new cruise missile,\u201d read the headline of a recent\u00a0article<\/a> by Mr. Weber, the former assistant secretary of defense, and William J. Perry, a secretary of defense under President Bill Clinton and an author of the plan to gradually eliminate nuclear weapons that captivated Mr. Obama\u2019s imagination and endorsement.<\/p>\n

They argued that the cruise missile might sway a future president to contemplate \u201climited nuclear war.\u201d Worse yet, they said, because the missile comes in nuclear and non-nuclear varieties, a foe under attack might assume the worst and overreact, initiating nuclear war.<\/p>\n

The critique stung because Mr. Perry, now at Stanford, is a revered figure in Democratic defense circles and a mentor to Ashton B. Carter, the secretary of defense.<\/p>\n

Mr. McKeon, the Pentagon official, after describing his respect for Mr. Perry, said the military concluded that it needed the cruise missile to \u201cgive the president more options than a manned bomber to penetrate air defenses.\u201d<\/p>\n

In an interview, James N. Miller, who helped develop the modernization plan before leaving his post as under secretary of defense for policy in 2014, said the smaller, more precise weapons would maintain the nation\u2019s nuclear deterrent while reducing risks for civilians near foreign military targets.<\/p>\n

\u201cThough not everyone agrees, I think it\u2019s the right way to proceed,\u201d Mr. Miller said. \u201cMinimizing civilian casualties if deterrence fails is both a more credible and a more ethical approach.\u201d<\/p>\n

General Cartwright summarized the logic of enhanced deterrence with a gun metaphor: \u201cIt makes the trigger easier to pull but makes the need to pull the trigger less likely.\u201d<\/p>\n

Administration officials often stress the modernization plan\u2019s benign aspects. Facing concerned allies, Madelyn R. Creedon, an Energy Department deputy administrator, argued<\/a> in October that the efforts \u201care not providing any new military capabilities\u201d but simply replacing wires, batteries, plastics and other failing materials.<\/p>\n

\u201cWhat we are doing,\u201d she said, \u201cis just taking these old systems, replacing their parts and making sure that they can survive.\u201d<\/p>\n

In a recent report to Congress<\/a>, the Energy Department, responsible for upgrading the warheads, said this was the fastest way to reduce the nuclear stockpile, promoting the effort as \u201cModernize to Downsize.\u201d<\/p>\n

The new weapons will let the nation scrap a Cold War standby called the B83, a powerful city buster. The report stressed that the declines in \u201coverall destructive power\u201d support Mr. Obama\u2019s goal of \u201cpursuing the security of a world without nuclear weapons.\u201d<\/p>\n

That argument, though, is extremely long term: Stockpile reductions would manifest only after three decades of atomic revitalization, many presidencies from now. One of those presidents may well cancel the reduction plans \u2014 most of the candidates now seeking the Republican nomination oppose cutbacks in the nuclear arsenal.<\/p>\n

But the bigger risk to the modernization plan may be its expense \u2014 upward of a trillion dollars if future presidents go the next step and order new bombers, submarines and land-based missiles, and upgrades to eight factories and laboratories.<\/p>\n

\u201cInsiders don\u2019t believe it will ever happen,\u201d said Mr. Coyle, the former White House official. \u201cIt\u2019s hard to imagine that many administrations following through.\u201d<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, other veterans of the Obama administration ask what happened.<\/p>\n

\u201cI think there\u2019s a universal sense of frustration,\u201d said Ellen O. Tauscher, a former under secretary of state for arms control. She said many who joined the administration with high expectations for arms reductions now feel disillusioned.<\/p>\n

\u201cSomebody has to get serious,\u201d she added. \u201cWe\u2019re spending billions of dollars on a status quo that doesn\u2019t make us any safer.\u201d<\/p>\n

You can read the original article here<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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