Sarah Tully
\nNovember 29, 2015<\/p>\n
Earlier this month, Northrop Grumman won the massive contract for the next-generation bomber aircraft, the Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B). The program will cost an estimated $100 billion to acquire, and an additional $100 billion for operations and support; but if previous air force programs are any indicator, that number will only go up.<\/p>\n
The bomber, which will have both nuclear and conventional missions, is a part of the current plans to modernize all three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad over the next thirty years, an undertaking that could cost upwards of $1 trillion<\/a>. With large spending projects on the horizon, the contract award for the bomber sets up a sobering reality check for the Pentagon: that money is going to have to come from somewhere.<\/p>\n The Navy Sets a Precedent<\/strong><\/p>\n One option is to divvy up the bill, paying for all or part of the program from a pot of money apart from the normal budget. Congress is currently working to create a loophole to pay for the navy\u2019s leg of the nuclear triad, its submarines, outside of its standard budget: the so-called National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, a scheme set up by Congress to fund the Ohio<\/em>-class replacement subs.<\/p>\n Lawmakers argued that because the new submarines are a \u201cnational asset,\u201d they shouldn\u2019t have to be funded using the navy\u2019s regular shipbuilding money. It will take nearly $100 billion just to procure<\/a> the Ohio<\/em>-class ballistic missile submarine program, and the Sea-Based Deterrence Fund would, in theory, allow the navy to pay for the subs through this off-budget account while funding its other projects through its regular budget.<\/p>\n Although lawmakers have never actually appropriated money for the account, the FY 2016 defense authorization bill expands transfer authority for the account, and even authorizes the transfer of $1.39 billion for it. By deferring fiscal responsibility for the new nuclear subs from the navy to the entire defense budget, the navy gets to avoid making tough choices on what programs to prioritize.<\/p>\n With such a precedent set, what is keeping the air force from getting its own special, off-budget account for the bomber it also can\u2019t afford?<\/p>\n In fact, some policy makers are indeed eyeing the special submarine fund as a model for a potential way to bankroll the new bomber. In January 2015, Lt. Gen. Stephen Wilson, Commander of Global Strike Command, said<\/a>, \u201cWe\u2019re looking to see how we can do something like that\u201d in response to a potential Air Force version of the Sea-Based Deterrence fund.<\/p>\n The Origins of Loophole Budgeting<\/strong><\/p>\n The inspiration for these accounts was likely the Overseas Contingency Operations account (OCO), the most egregious loophole in the federal budgetary process. Unlike the Pentagon base budget and all discretionary non-defense spending, OCO is not subject to the budget caps imposed by the 2011 Budget Control Act. Consequently, OCO is used by all branches of the military as a slush fund to pay for projects that it can\u2019t afford out of the base budget.<\/p>\n President George W. Bush established an emergency war funding mechanism after 9\/11 to pay for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan because it was easier<\/a> than planning for war spending within the base budget.<\/p>\n But Bush stretched the definition of \u201cemergency\u201d and used the supplemental account longer than he should have. The account has since expanded from a war fund to a true Pentagon slush fund, adding, for instance, funding for the F-15 aircraft program when none of these planes have been shot down in Afghanistan or Iraq.<\/p>\n President Obama tried to change this by creating the Overseas Contingency Operations account, and restrict what does and does not count as eligible for OCO. But the rules about \u201chat counts and what doesn\u2019t quickly slackened.<\/p>\n