{"id":3854,"date":"2015-07-01T14:50:48","date_gmt":"2015-07-01T20:50:48","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/?p=3854"},"modified":"2015-07-01T14:50:48","modified_gmt":"2015-07-01T20:50:48","slug":"justice-department-faults-ferguson-protest-response","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/justice-department-faults-ferguson-protest-response\/","title":{"rendered":"Justice Department faults Ferguson protest response"},"content":{"rendered":"

by\u00a0Christine Byers<\/a>, St. Louis Post Dispatch
\nclick her for original article<\/a><\/p>\n

Police trying to control the Ferguson protests and riots responded with an uncoordinated effort that sometimes violated free-speech rights, antagonized crowds with military-style tactics and shielded officers from accountability, the Justice Department says in a document obtained Monday by the Post-Dispatch.<\/p>\n

\u201cVague and arbitrary\u201d orders to keep protesters moving \u201cviolated citizens\u2019 right to assembly and free speech, as determined by a U.S. federal court injunction,\u201d according to a summary of a longer report scheduled for delivery this week to police brass in Ferguson, St. Louis County, St. Louis and Missouri Highway Patrol.<\/p>\n

They already have the summary, still subject to revision, that was obtained by the newspaper.<\/p>\n

It suggests that last year\u2019s unrest was aggravated by long-standing community animosity toward Ferguson police, and by a failure of commanders to provide more details to the public after an officer killed Michael Brown.<\/p>\n

\u201cHad law enforcement released information on the officer-involved shooting in a timely manner and continued the information flow as it became available, community distrust and media skepticism would most likely have been lessened,\u201d according to the document.<\/p>\n

It also says that use of dogs for crowd control incited fear and anger, and the practice ought to be prohibited. And it complains that tear gas was sometimes used without warning and on people in areas from which there was no safe retreat.<\/p>\n

Moreover, it finds inconsistencies in the way police used force and made arrests.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe four core agencies dedicated officer training on operational and tactical skills without appropriate balance of de-escalation and problem-solving training,\u201d it reads.<\/p>\n

The Justice Department examined the response of the four agencies in the first 16 days after Ferguson Officer Darren Wilson shot Brown, 18, in a controversial confrontation Aug. 9. Those departments were the key players in managing unrest that drew help from about 50 jurisdictions across the region.<\/p>\n

In all, the full report is expected to contain about 45 \u201cfindings,\u201d with recommendations for improvement on each point.<\/p>\n

Federal officials had a conference call last week with St. Louis Chief Sam Dotson, St. Louis County Chief Jon Belmar, Missouri Highway Patrol Superintendent J. Bret Johnson and Ferguson Interim Chief Al Eickhoff, seeking feedback on the summary, Dotson said Monday.<\/p>\n

He said he requested an in-person review of the full report \u2014 almost 200 pages \u2014 later this week.<\/p>\n

\u201cI don\u2019t know if I agree with them or not, because I don\u2019t have enough information,\u201d Dotson said. \u201cI said we can\u2019t comment without the whole document.\u201d<\/p>\n

Belmar declined to comment Monday, saying he would address his concerns directly to federal officials. His office later issued a statement, saying, in part, \u201c… this was presented to us as a draft, confidential report, and our responsibility is to work with\u201d federal officials \u201cto ensure the accuracy of the draft…\u201d<\/p>\n

Ferguson officials issued a statement saying they are \u201creviewing these latest findings and will act accordingly.\u201d The Missouri Department of Public Safety, which oversees the highway patrol, did not respond to a request for comment.<\/p>\n

Dotson said he hopes the final report from the Community Oriented Policing Services branch of the Justice Department will provide a \u201croad map\u201d for police facing similar situations.<\/p>\n

He said he once asked COPS officials about best practices in responding to such protests. \u201cI was told, \u2018There are none, you are forging new ground,\u2019\u201d Dotson said.<\/p>\n

Dotson also said such \u201cafter-action\u201d reviews are not uncommon, noting they followed incidents like Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and the Rodney King riots in Los Angeles.<\/p>\n

This will be the third of four Justice Department reports in the wake of Ferguson unrest. The first two were released simultaneously in March.\u00a0One said Wilson was justified in shooting Brown<\/a>; the other\u00a0strongly criticized past practices by the Ferguson police and municipal court<\/a>, and triggered a continuing effort toward enforcing changes either by negotiation or lawsuit.<\/p>\n

The fourth report will be an analysis of the St. Louis County Police Department\u2019s practices. Sources say it is expected to be out sometime in July.<\/p>\n

\u2018UNIFIED COMMAND\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n

County police headed up the initial days of the response, but Gov. Jay Nixon shifted command to the highway patrol. Ultimately, the county police, highway patrol and St. Louis police formed a \u201cunified command\u201d to oversee response as protests and rioting spread.<\/p>\n

The summary primarily addresses actions and is not specifically critical of individual officials.<\/p>\n

From the beginning, the summary finds, the use of a \u201chighly elevated tactical response,\u201d essentially set a tone that \u201climited options for a measured, strategic approach.\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

For example, positioning an officer atop an armored vehicle to monitor the crowd through rifle sights was \u201cinappropriate\u201d and only served to \u201cexacerbate tensions between protesters and the police,\u201d it says.<\/p>\n

It acknowledges that a tactical response was warranted at times, but an \u201celevated daytime response was not justified and served to escalate rather than de-escalate the overall situation.\u201d<\/p>\n

The summary faults as \u201cineffective\u201d the control of officers with various levels of training from departments with differing police philosophies.<\/p>\n

It says failures in traffic control resulted in \u201ctactical advantages to the protesters and activists and safety hazards to the deployed officers.\u201d<\/p>\n

And it highlights several breakdowns in internal communications, suggesting that intelligence obtained about the protests was not well-used and that some departments had incompatible radios.<\/p>\n

The four departments \u201cunderestimated the impact social media had on the incident and the speed at which both facts and rumors were spread and failed to have a social media strategy,\u201d the summary finds.<\/p>\n

The departments also were unprepared for the use of technology and hacks into personal computers which led to identity theft for some officers. The threats led some officers to remove name tags from their uniforms, which the report says \u201cdefeated an essential level of on-scene accountability that is fundamental to the perception of procedural justice and legitimacy.\u201d<\/p>\n

It says, \u201cOfficers were not prepared for the volume and severity of personal threats on themselves and their families, which created additional emotional stress for those involved in the Ferguson response. This includes threats of violence against family members and fraud associated with technology based attacks.\u201d<\/p>\n

It continues, \u201cThe intensity of the circumstances and the length of the event led to officers exhibiting fatigue and stress, which impacted health, well-being, judgment and performance.\u201d<\/p>\n

The report also focuses on transparency, noting that among the four agencies, only St. Louis County makes its policies publicly accessible on a website.<\/p>\n

It says all four agencies have procedures for receiving and processing citizen complaints, but they \u201cmay not have been adequate for the unique circumstances of the Ferguson incident.\u201d<\/p>\n

County and city police each reported one officer complaint during the 16-day assessment period, but the report says the number is \u201cmisleading\u201d because \u201ca lack of confidence in the complaint process likely deterred citizens from filing complaints about police behavior.\u201d<\/p>\n

Along with the criticisms, the report outlines suggestions for improvements.<\/p>\n

Those include keeping tactical teams out of sight unless needed, and color coding nonlethal weapons to calm the public and remind officers.<\/p>\n

They call for regional training sessions that would emphasize de-escalation before resorting to force.<\/p>\n

As for officer safety, the summary suggests that departments allow some alternate form of unique identification that still protects their names and to provide a more streamlined process for citizens to file complaints and compliments.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

by\u00a0Christine Byers, St. Louis Post Dispatch click her for original article Police trying to control the Ferguson protests and riots responded with an uncoordinated effort that sometimes violated free-speech rights, antagonized crowds with military-style tactics and shielded officers from accountability, the Justice Department says in a document obtained Monday by the Post-Dispatch. \u201cVague and arbitrary\u201d […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"nf_dc_page":"","om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3854","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3854","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3854"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3854\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3856,"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3854\/revisions\/3856"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3854"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3854"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3854"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}