{"id":2827,"date":"2014-02-10T19:42:31","date_gmt":"2014-02-11T01:42:31","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/?p=2827"},"modified":"2014-02-11T12:26:40","modified_gmt":"2014-02-11T18:26:40","slug":"the-nsas-secret-role-in-the-u-s-assassination-program","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/the-nsas-secret-role-in-the-u-s-assassination-program\/","title":{"rendered":"The NSA\u2019s secret role in the U.S. assassination program"},"content":{"rendered":"

by\u00a0Jeremy Scahill<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0<\/a>Glenn Greenwald<\/a>, The Intercept
\nclick here for original article<\/a><\/p>\n

The National Security Agency is using complex analysis of electronic surveillance, rather than human intelligence, as the primary method to locate targets for lethal drone strikes \u2013 an unreliable tactic that results in the deaths of innocent or unidentified people.<\/p>\n

According to a former drone operator for the military\u2019s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) who also worked with the NSA, the agency often identifies targets based on controversial metadata analysis and cell-phone tracking technologies. Rather than confirming a target\u2019s identity with operatives or informants on the ground, the CIA or the U.S. military then orders a strike based on the activity and location of the mobile phone a person is believed to be using.<\/p>\n

The drone operator, who agreed to discuss the top-secret programs on the condition of anonymity, was a member of JSOC\u2019s High Value Targeting task force, which is charged with identifying, capturing or killing terrorist suspects in Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan and elsewhere.<\/p>\n

His account is bolstered by top-secret NSA documents previously provided by whistleblower Edward Snowden. It is also supported by a former drone sensor operator with the U.S. Air Force, Brandon Bryant, who has become an outspoken critic of the lethal operations in which he was directly involved in Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen.<\/p>\n

In one tactic, the NSA \u201cgeolocates\u201d the SIM card or handset of a suspected terrorist\u2019s mobile phone, enabling the CIA and U.S. military to conduct night raids and drone strikes to kill or capture the individual in possession of the device.<\/p>\n

The former JSOC drone operator is adamant that the technology has been responsible for taking out terrorists and networks of people facilitating improvised explosive device attacks against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. But he also states that innocent people have \u201cabsolutely\u201d been killed as a result of the NSA\u2019s increasing reliance on the surveillance tactic.<\/p>\n

One problem, he explains, is that targets are increasingly aware of the NSA\u2019s reliance on geolocating, and have moved to thwart the tactic. Some have as many as 16 different SIM cards associated with their identity within the High Value Target system. Others, unaware that their mobile phone is being targeted, lend their phone, with the SIM card in it, to friends, children, spouses and family members.<\/p>\n

Some top Taliban leaders, knowing of the NSA\u2019s targeting method, have purposely and randomly distributed SIM cards among their units in order to elude their trackers. \u201cThey would do things like go to meetings, take all their SIM cards out, put them in a bag, mix them up, and everybody gets a different SIM card when they leave,\u201d the former drone operator says. \u201cThat\u2019s how they confuse us.\u201d<\/p>\n

As a result, even when the agency correctly identifies and targets a SIM card belonging to a terror suspect, the phone may actually be carried by someone else, who is then killed in a strike. According to the former drone operator, the geolocation cells at the NSA that run the tracking program \u2013 known as Geo Cell \u2013sometimes facilitate strikes without knowing whether the individual in possession of a tracked cell phone or SIM card is in fact the intended target of the strike.<\/p>\n

\u201cOnce the bomb lands or a night raid happens, you know that phone is there,\u201d he says. \u201cBut we don\u2019t know who\u2019s behind it, who\u2019s holding it. It\u2019s of course assumed that the phone belongs to a human being who is nefarious and considered an \u2018unlawful enemy combatant.\u2019 This is where it gets very shady.\u201d<\/p>\n

The former drone operator also says that he personally participated in drone strikes where the identity of the target was known, but other unknown people nearby were also killed.<\/p>\n

\u201cThey might have been terrorists,\u201d he says. \u201cOr they could have been family members who have nothing to do with the target\u2019s activities.\u201d<\/p>\n

What\u2019s more, he adds, the NSA often locates drone targets by analyzing the activity of a SIM card, rather than the actual content of the calls. Based on his experience, he has come to believe that the drone program amounts to little more than death by unreliable metadata.<\/p>\n

\u201cPeople get hung up that there\u2019s a targeted list of people,\u201d he says. \u201cIt\u2019s really like we\u2019re targeting a cell phone. We\u2019re not going after people \u2013 we\u2019re\u00a0going after their phones, in the hopes that the person on the other end of that missile is the bad guy.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Obama administration has repeatedly insisted that its operations kill terrorists with the utmost precision.<\/p>\n

In his speech at the National Defense University last May, President Obama declared that \u201cbefore any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured \u2013 the highest standard we can set.\u201d He added that, \u201cby narrowly targeting our action against those who want to kill us and not the people they hide among, we are choosing the course of action least likely to result in the loss of innocent life.\u201d<\/p>\n

But the increased reliance on phone tracking and other fallible surveillance tactics suggests that the opposite is true. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, which uses a conservative methodology to track drone strikes,\u00a0estimates<\/a>\u00a0that at least 273 civilians in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia have been killed by unmanned aerial assaults under the Obama administration.\u00a0A recent study conducted by a U.S. military adviser found that, during a single year in Afghanistan \u2013 where the majority of drone strikes have taken place \u2013 unmanned vehicles were 10 times more likely than conventional aircraft to cause civilian casualties.<\/p>\n

The NSA declined to respond to questions for this article. Caitlin Hayden, a spokesperson for the National Security Council, also refused to discuss \u201cthe type of operational detail that, in our view, should not be published.\u201d<\/p>\n

In describing the administration\u2019s policy on targeted killings, Hayden would not say whether strikes are ever ordered without the use of human intelligence. She emphasized that \u201cour assessments are not based on a single piece of information. We gather and scrutinize information from a variety of sources and methods before we draw conclusions.\u201d<\/p>\n

Hayden felt free, however, to note the role that human intelligence plays\u00a0after<\/em>\u00a0a deadly strike occurs. \u201cAfter any use of targeted lethal force, when there are indications that civilian deaths may have occurred, intelligence analysts draw on a large body of information \u2013 including human intelligence, signals intelligence, media reports, and surveillance footage \u2013 to help us make informed determinations about whether civilians were in fact killed or injured.\u201d<\/p>\n

The government does not appear to apply the same standard of care in selecting whom to target for assassination. The former JSOC drone operator estimates that the overwhelming majority of high-value target operations he worked on in Afghanistan relied on signals intelligence, known as SIGINT, based on the NSA\u2019s phone-tracking technology.<\/p>\n

\u201cEverything they turned into a kinetic strike or a night raid was almost 90 percent that,\u201d he says. \u201cYou could tell, because you\u2019d go back to the mission reports and it will say \u2018this mission was triggered by SIGINT,\u2019 which means it was triggered by a geolocation cell.\u201d<\/p>\n

In July, the\u00a0Washington Post<\/em>\u00a0relied exclusively on former senior U.S. intelligence officials and anonymous sources to herald the NSA\u2019s claims about its effectiveness at geolocating terror suspects.<\/p>\n

Within the NSA, the paper\u00a0reported<\/a>, \u201cA motto quickly caught on at Geo Cell: \u2018We Track \u2019Em, You Whack \u2019Em.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n

But the\u00a0Post<\/em>\u00a0article included virtually no skepticism about the NSA\u2019s claims, and no discussion at all about how the unreliability of the agency\u2019s targeting methods results in the killing of innocents.<\/p>\n

In fact, as the former JSOC drone operator recounts, tracking people by metadata and then killing them by SIM card is inherently flawed. The NSA \u201cwill develop a pattern,\u201d he says, \u201cwhere they understand that this is what this person\u2019s voice sounds like, this is who his friends are, this is who his commander is, this is who his subordinates are. And they put them into a matrix. But it\u2019s not always correct. There\u2019s a lot of human error in that.\u201d<\/p>\n

The JSOC operator\u2019s account is supported by another insider who was directly involved in the drone program. Brandon Bryant spent six years as a \u201cstick monkey\u201d \u2013 a drone sensor operator who controls the \u201ceyes\u201d of the U.S. military\u2019s unmanned aerial vehicles. By the time he left the Air Force in 2011, Bryant\u2019s squadron, which included a small crew of veteran drone operators, had been credited with killing 1,626 \u201cenemies\u201d in action.<\/p>\n

Bryant says he has come forward because he is tormented by the loss of civilian life he believes that he and his squadron may have caused. Today he is committed to informing the public about lethal flaws in the U.S. drone program.<\/p>\n

Bryant describes the program as highly compartmentalized: Drone operators taking shots at targets on the ground have little idea where the intelligence is coming from.<\/p>\n

\u201cI don\u2019t know who we worked with,\u201d Bryant says. \u201cWe were never privy to that sort of information. If the NSA did work with us, like, I have no clue.\u201d<\/p>\n

During the course of his career, Bryant says, many targets of U.S. drone strikes evolved their tactics, particularly in the handling of cell phones. \u201cThey\u2019ve gotten really smart now and they don\u2019t make the same mistakes as they used to,\u201d he says. \u201cThey\u2019d get rid of the SIM card and they\u2019d get a new phone, or they\u2019d put the SIM card in the new phone.\u201d<\/p>\n

As the former JSOC drone operator describes \u2013 and as classified documents obtained from Snowden confirm \u2013 the NSA doesn\u2019t just locate the cell phones of terror suspects by intercepting communications from cell phone towers and Internet service providers. The agency also equips drones and other aircraft with devices known as \u201cvirtual base-tower transceivers\u201d \u2013 creating, in effect, a fake cell phone tower that can force a targeted person\u2019s device to lock onto the NSA\u2019s receiver without their knowledge.<\/p>\n

That, in turn, allows the military to track the cell phone to within 30 feet of its actual location, feeding the real-time data to teams of drone operators who conduct missile strikes or facilitate night raids.<\/p>\n

The NSA geolocation system used by JSOC is known by the code name GILGAMESH. Under the program, a specially constructed device is attached to the drone. As the drone circles, the device locates the SIM card or handset that the military believes is used by the target.<\/p>\n

\"DT-1<\/p>\n

Relying on this method, says the former JSOC drone operator, means that the \u201cwrong people\u201d could be killed due to metadata errors, particularly in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia. \u201cWe don\u2019t have people on the ground \u2013 we don\u2019t have the same forces, informants, or information coming in from those areas \u2013 as we do where we have a strong foothold, like we do in Afghanistan. I would say that it\u2019s even more likely that mistakes are made in places such as Yemen or Somalia, and especially Pakistan.\u201d<\/p>\n

As of May 2013, according to the former drone operator, President Obama had cleared 16 people in Yemen and five in Somalia for targeting in strikes. Before a strike is green-lit, he says, there must be at least two sources of intelligence. The problem is that both of those sources often involve NSA-supplied data, rather than human intelligence (HUMINT).<\/p>\n

As the former drone operator explains, the process of tracking and ultimately killing a targeted person is known within the military as F3: Find, Fix, Finish. \u201cSince there\u2019s almost zero HUMINT operations in Yemen \u2013 at least involving JSOC \u2013 every one of their strikes relies on signals and imagery for confirmation: signals being the cell phone lock, which is the \u2018find\u2019 and imagery being the \u2018unblinking eye\u2019 which is the \u2018fix.\u2019\u201d The \u201cfinish\u201d is the strike itself.<\/p>\n

\u201cJSOC acknowledges that it would be completely helpless without the NSA conducting mass surveillance on an industrial level,\u201d the former drone operator says. \u201cThat is what creates those baseball cards you hear about,\u201d featuring potential targets for drone strikes or raids.<\/p>\n

President Obama signs authorizations for \u201chits\u201d that remain valid for 60 days. If a target cannot be located within that period, it must be reviewed and renewed. According to the former drone operator, it can take 18 months or longer to move from intelligence gathering to getting approval to actually carrying out a strike in Yemen. \u201cWhat that tells me,\u201d he says, \u201cis that commanders, once given the authorization needed to strike, are more likely to strike when they see an opportunity \u2013 even if there\u2019s a high chance of civilians being killed, too \u2013 because in their mind they might never get the chance to strike that target again.\u201d<\/p>\n

While drones are not the only method used to kill targets, they have become so prolific that they are now a standard part of U.S. military culture. Remotely piloted Reaper and Predator vehicles are often given nicknames. Among those used in Afghanistan, says the former JSOC drone operator, were \u201cLightning\u201d and \u201cSky Raider.\u201d<\/p>\n

The latter drone, he adds, was also referred to as \u201cSky Raper,\u201d for a simple reason \u2013 \u201cbecause it killed a lot of people.\u201d When operators were assigned to \u201cSky Raper,\u201d he adds, it meant that \u201csomebody was going to die. It was always set to the most high-priority missions.\u201d<\/p>\n

In addition to the GILGAMESH system used by JSOC, the CIA uses a similar NSA platform known as SHENANIGANS. The operation \u2013 previously undisclosed \u2013 utilizes a pod on aircraft that vacuums up massive amounts of data from any wireless routers, computers, smart phones or other electronic devices that are within range.<\/p>\n

One top-secret NSA document provided by Snowden is written by a SHENANIGANS operator who documents his March 2012 deployment to Oman, where the CIA has established a drone base. The operator describes how, from almost four miles in the air, he searched for communications devices believed to be used by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in neighboring Yemen.The mission was code named VICTORYDANCE.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe VICTORYDANCE mission was a great experience,\u201d the operator writes. \u201cIt was truly a joint interagency effort between CIA and NSA. Flights and targets were coordinated with both CIAers and NSAers. The mission lasted 6 months, during which 43 flights were flown.\u201d<\/p>\n

VICTORYDANCE, he adds, \u201cmapped the Wi-Fi fingerprint of nearly every major town in Yemen.\u201d<\/p>\n

\"DT-5<\/p>\n

\"DT-6<\/p>\n

The NSA has played an increasingly central role in drone killings over the past five years. In one top-secret NSA document from 2010, the head of the agency\u2019s Strategic Planning and Policy Division of the Counterterrorism Mission Management Center recounts the history of the NSA\u2019s involvement in Yemen. Shortly before President Obama took office, the document reveals, the agency began to \u201cshift analytic resources to focus on Yemen.\u201d<\/p>\n

In 2008, the NSA had only three analysts dedicated to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen. By the fall of 2009, it had 45 analysts, and the agency was producing \u201chigh quality\u201d signal intelligence for the CIA and JSOC.<\/p>\n

In December 2009, utilizing the NSA\u2019s metadata collection programs, the Obama administration dramatically escalated U.S. drone and cruise missile strikes in Yemen.<\/p>\n

The first strike in the country known to be authorized by Obama targeted an alleged Al Qaeda camp in the southern village of al-Majala.<\/p>\n

The strike, which included the use of cluster bombs,\u00a0resulted in the deaths<\/a>\u00a0of 14 women and 21 children. It is not clear whether the strike was based on metadata collection; the White House has never publicly explained the strike or the source of the faulty intelligence that led to the civilian fatalities.<\/p>\n

Another top-secret NSA document confirms that the agency \u201cplayed a key supporting role\u201d in the drone strike in September 2011 that killed U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, as well as another American, Samir Khan. According to the 2013 Congressional Budget Justification, \u201cThe CIA tracked [Awlaki] for three weeks before a joint operation with the U.S. military killed\u201d the two Americans in Yemen, along with two other people.<\/p>\n

When Brandon Bryant left his Air Force squadron in April 2011, the unit was aiding JSOC in its hunt for the American-born cleric. The CIA took the lead in the hunt for Awlaki after JSOC tried and failed to kill him in the spring of 2011.<\/p>\n

\"DT-4<\/p>\n

According to Bryant, the NSA\u2019s expanded role in Yemen has only added to what he sees as the risk of fatal errors already evident in CIA operations. \u201cThey\u2019re very non-discriminate with how they do things, as far as you can see their actions over in Pakistan and the devastation that they\u2019ve had there,\u201d Bryant says about the CIA. \u201cIt feels like they tried to bring those same tactics they used over in Pakistan down to Yemen. It\u2019s a repeat of tactical thinking, instead of intelligent thinking.\u201d<\/p>\n

Those within the system understand that the government\u2019s targeting tactics are fundamentally flawed. According to the former JSOC drone operator, instructors who oversee GILGAMESH training emphasize: \u201c\u2018This isn\u2019t a science. This is an art.\u2019 It\u2019s kind of a way of saying that it\u2019s not perfect.\u201d<\/p>\n

Yet the tracking \u201cpods\u201d mounted on the bottom of drones have facilitated thousands of \u201ccapture or kill\u201d operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan since September 11. One top-secret NSA document provided by Snowden notes that by 2009, \u201cfor the first time in the history of the U.S. Air Force, more pilots were trained to fly drones \u2026 than conventional fighter aircraft,\u201d leading to a \u201c\u2018tipping point\u2019 in U.S. military combat behavior in resorting to air strikes in areas of undeclared wars,\u201d such as Yemen and Pakistan.<\/p>\n

The document continues: \u201cDid you ever think you would see the day when the U.S. would be conducting combat operations in a country equipped with nuclear weapons without a boot on the ground or a pilot in the air?\u201d<\/p>\n

Even NSA operatives seem to recognize how profoundly the agency\u2019s tracking technology deviates from standard operating methods of war.<\/p>\n

One NSA document from 2005 poses this question: \u201cWhat resembles \u2018LITTLE BOY\u2019 (one of the atomic bombs dropped on Japan during World War II) and as LITTLE BOY did, represents the dawn of a new era (at least in SIGINT and precision geolocation)?\u201d<\/p>\n

Its reply: \u201cIf you answered a pod mounted on an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) that is currently flying in support of the Global War on Terrorism, you would be correct.\u201d<\/p>\n

\"DT-3-1<\/p>\n

Another document boasts that geolocation technology has \u201ccued and compressed numerous \u2018kill chains\u2019 (i.e. all of the steps taken to find, track, target, and engage the enemy), resulting in untold numbers of enemy killed and captured in Afghanistan as well as the saving of U.S. and Coalition lives.\u201d<\/p>\n

The former JSOC drone operator, however, remains highly disturbed by the unreliability of such methods. Like other whistleblowers, including Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning, he says that his efforts to alert his superiors to the problems were brushed off. \u201cThe system continues to work because, like most things in the military, the people who use it trust it unconditionally,\u201d he says.<\/p>\n

When he would raise objections about intelligence that was \u201crushed\u201d or \u201cinaccurate\u201d or \u201coutright wrong,\u201d he adds, \u201cthe most common response I would get was \u2018JSOC wouldn\u2019t spend millions and millions of dollars, and man hours, to go after someone if they weren\u2019t certain that they were the right person.\u2019 There is a saying at the NSA: \u2018SIGINT never lies.\u2019 It may be true that SIGINT never lies, but it\u2019s subject to human error.\u201d<\/p>\n

The government\u2019s assassination program is actually constructed, he adds, to avoid self-correction. \u201cThey make rushed decisions and are often wrong in their assessments. They jump to conclusions and there is no going back to correct mistakes.\u201d Because there is an ever-increasing demand for more targets to be added to the kill list, he says, the mentality is \u201cjust keep feeding the beast.\u201d<\/p>\n

For Bryant, the killing of Awlaki \u2013 followed two weeks later by the killing of his 16-year-old son, Abdulrahman al Awlaki, also an American citizen \u2013 motivated him to speak out. Last October, Bryant appeared before a panel of experts at the United Nations \u2013 including the UN\u2019s special rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism, Ben Emmerson, who is currently conducting an investigation into civilians killed by drone strikes.<\/p>\n

Dressed in hiking boots and brown cargo pants, Bryant called for \u201cindependent investigations\u201d into the Obama administration\u2019s drone program. \u201cAt the end of our pledge of allegiance, we say \u2018with liberty and justice for all,\u2019\u201d he told the panel. \u201cI believe that should be applied to not only American citizens, but everyone that we interact with as well, to put them on an equal level and to treat them with respect.\u201d<\/p>\n

Unlike those who oversee the drone program, Bryant also took personal responsibility for his actions in the killing of Awlaki. \u201cI was a drone operator for six years, active duty for six years in the U.S. Air Force, and I was party to the violations of constitutional rights of an American citizen who should have been tried under a jury,\u201d he said. \u201cAnd because I violated that constitutional right, I became an enemy of the American people.\u201d<\/p>\n

Bryant later told\u00a0The Intercept<\/em>, \u201cI had to get out because we were told that the president wanted Awlaki dead. And I wanted him dead. I was told that he was a traitor to our country\u2026. I didn\u2019t really understand that our Constitution covers people, American citizens, who have betrayed our country. They still deserve a trial.\u201d<\/p>\n

The killing of Awlaki and his son still haunt Bryant. The younger Awlaki, Abdulrahman, had run away from home to try to find his dad, whom he had not seen in three years. But his father was killed before Abdulrahman could locate him. Abdulrahman was then killed in a separate strike two weeks later as he ate dinner with his teenage cousin and some friends. The White House has never explained the strike.<\/p>\n

\u201cI don\u2019t think there\u2019s any day that goes by when I don\u2019t think about those two, to be honest,\u201d Bryant says. \u201cThe kid doesn\u2019t seem like someone who would be a suicide bomber or want to die or something like that. He honestly seems like a kid who missed his dad and went there to go see his dad.\u201d<\/p>\n

Last May, President Obama acknowledged that \u201cthe necessary secrecy\u201d involved in lethal strikes \u201ccan end up shielding our government from the public scrutiny that a troop deployment invites. It can also lead a president and his team to view drone strikes as a cure-all for terrorism.\u201d<\/p>\n

But that, says the former JSOC operator, is precisely what has happened. Given how much the government now relies on drone strikes \u2013 and given how many of those strikes are now dependent on metadata rather than human intelligence \u2013 the operator warns that political officials may view the geolocation program as more dependable than it really is.<\/p>\n

\u201cI don\u2019t know whether or not President Obama would be comfortable approving the drone strikes if he knew the potential for mistakes that are there,\u201d he says. \u201cAll he knows is what he\u2019s told.\u201d<\/p>\n

Whether or not Obama is fully aware of the errors built into the program of targeted assassination, he and his top advisors have repeatedly made clear that the president himself directly oversees the drone operation and takes full responsibility for it. Obama once\u00a0reportedly told his aides<\/a>\u00a0that it \u201cturns out I\u2019m really good at killing people.\u201d<\/p>\n

The president added, \u201cDidn\u2019t know that was gonna be a strong suit of mine.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

by\u00a0Jeremy Scahill\u00a0and\u00a0Glenn Greenwald, The Intercept click here for original article The National Security Agency is using complex analysis of electronic surveillance, rather than human intelligence, as the primary method to locate targets for lethal drone strikes \u2013 an unreliable tactic that results in the deaths of innocent or unidentified people. According to a former drone […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":2847,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"nf_dc_page":"","om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2827","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/02\/tumblr_n0sus2mT2M1r6m2leo1_5001.jpg?fit=278%2C343&ssl=1","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2827","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2827"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2827\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2848,"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2827\/revisions\/2848"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2847"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2827"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2827"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/peaceeconomyproject.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2827"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}