The London Naval Conference of 1930
By Jason Sibert
The London Naval Conference of 1930 was one of a series of five meeting that attempted to limit the naval spending of the world’s largest naval powers.
The United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, and France all met in London with the intent of limiting naval power. The 1930 conference was also an attempt to diffuse geopolitical tensions in the world and prevent another world war. Of course, the attempt was a failure. The first meeting on the naval spending issue was the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 and the second was a conference in Geneva in 1927.
All sides were ready to reach an agreement when the final meeting occurred in 1930. Restrictions on naval tonnage were a big issue. The conference established a ratio of 5:5:3 for capital ships – for every five capital ships the Americans and British had, the Japanese were allowed three. In 1927, Japan insisted that the ratio for auxiliary vessels be increased to 10:10:7, rather than maintaining the 5:5:3 ratio. If the United States was to have 18 heavy cruisers, the latter ratio placed the Japanese limit at 10 cruisers; however, at the time of the conference, Japan had built or was building 12 new ships. The United States was the power most opposed to granting the higher ratio, although it ultimately conceded the point; the official terms of the treaty granted the 10:7 ratio on light cruisers and destroyers and maintained the 10:6 ratio on heavy cruisers, but with a compromise under which the United States delayed its shipbuilding program to give Japan a grace period with a 10:7 ratio in heavy cruisers as well.
The other key issue of the 1930 conference was the maximum tonnage for light cruisers. The United States was opposed to any maximum lower than 10,000 tons, because given the nature of its international commitments–in particular, its involvement in the Philippines and East Asia and the limited number of refueling stations available in the Pacific–lighter cruisers would not be of much use. Although it compromised on the Japanese ratio and the heavy cruisers, the United States refused to yield on this issue, in spite of the fact that the other powers were far more willing to accept the British maximum of 7,000 tons. In the end, the U.S. position prevailed.
The final treaty limited tonnage of auxiliary ships, as well as the size and gun power of submarines and destroyers. In all but “offensive” ship categories, it granted the Japanese their long-sought 10:10:7 ratio. The treaty also set maximum tonnage for cruisers at 339,000 tons for Great Britain, 323,500 tons for the United States, and 208,850 tons for Japan. The maximum numbers of heavy cruisers were set at 18 for America, 15 for Great Britain, and 12 for Japan. The Treaty upheld and extended the provision in the 1922 treaty that prohibited the powers from building new capital ships for 5 years. The provisions in both the Five-Power Treaty of 1922 and the 1930 treaty were set to expire in 1936.
Although it was described as an “arms limitation conference,” the London Naval Treaty set limits above the current capacity of some of the powers involved. The U.S. Senate approved the treaty in July of 1930 over the objections of key naval officers concerned that the naval limitations would inhibit the American ability to defend its control of the Philippine islands.
In 1935, the powers met for a second London Naval Conference to renegotiate the Washington and London treaties before their expiration the following year. The Japanese, increasingly under the sway of Japanese Fascism, walked out of that conference, but Great Britain, France, and the United States signed an agreement declaring a six-year holiday on building large light cruisers in the 8,000 to 10,000 ton range. That final decision marked the end to the decade-long controversy over cruisers.
The naval conferences where an attempt to control armaments in the decades after World War I. The agreements were null and void when the world plunged into World War II. The reason for the failure was the emergence of Fascism in Europe and Asia. These ideologies were ultra-nationalist and had no respect for international law, as they only cared about conquest. They were stopped in their thirst for conquest.
The right-wing populism that is emerging in countries around the world is different from the Fascism of the 1930’s, although it is similar in some respects. The advocates of these contemporary movements don’t seem willing to invade foreign countries, although they have a list of scapegoats just like the Fascists. However, there is a lesson to be learned from the 1930’s and the rise of Fascism and that’s when ultra-nationalistic movements emerge, the contempt for international law rises. Let’s hope right-wing populism, and the respect for international law, can be defeated before it’s too late.
Jason Sibert is the executive director of the Peace Economy Project in St Louis.
