The INF Treaty and Balancing China

By Megan Horn

President Donald Trump has confirmed his administration’s intentions of withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The administration plans on giving Russia 180 days to destroy the weapons it possesses in violation of the treaty. The INF, signed by President Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987, was used not only to simmer Cold War tensions but to pull countries back from the brink of nuclear tensions and a potential arms race. At the time of INF’s creation, Russia was in violation of the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty. However, the treaty was not abandoned in response to non-compliance, as talks were held to circumvent an arms race; the talks led to the bilateral agreement between the US and Russia to prohibit missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

Washington has accused Russia of violations in both 2014 when it tested ground launched cruise missiles and in 2017 when it deployed the 9M729,  both weapons systems are prohibited by the treaty. Russia has since then offered visual checks, but the US demands full destruction of weapons – perhaps this move is more about killing the treaty than achieving compliance.

National Security Advisor John Bolton is credited with pushing the president in the direction of termination. He has a history of disliking the INF since its negotiation. In an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal in 2011, Bolton advocated leaving INF due to China’s growing missile arsenal in proximity to allied nations. Bolton urged to either get more signatories or to rebuild deterrents. The idea of bringing in more signatories is not new, a joint proposition was made in 2007 to expand the INF agreement to nations previously not included and to ‘work with all interested countries,’ but neither party has invested seriously into this idea.

The current frustration with the INF is not surprising, as the treaty only governs two signatories – Russia and the US – while it does nothing to limit the arms of other strategic countries like China. Despite the slowing economy, China’s defense budget is growing. According to the Department of Defense, China’s defense spending averaged out to 8.5 percent per year from 2007 through 2016. China’s growing investments may eventually present a threat to Pacific allies, yet the current administration may be biting off more than it can chew by terminating the INF. Pulling out allows  the US to partake in fielding ground based intermediate-range missiles which have been a recent interest of the administration. Since GBIRs are cheaper and more survivable, they are seen a better deterrent to China.

Perhaps the termination of the INF might not appear hasty if US allies were adequately consulted on the pull out. If the administration were to go forward with GBIR development to deter China, Pacific allies would be forced to host weapons. Japan opposes withdrawal and would most likely be outright in domestic opposition if it were to host GBIRs. Missiles hosted in South Korea seems like a stretch due to China’s negative reaction to the THAAD missile defense system deployed to protect against North Korean missiles which cost $7 billion in sanctions against South Korea. The Philippines and Taiwan’s teetering relationships with both the United States and China are also not favorable to hosting GBIRs. Furthermore, involving other countries may create a dual-key arrangement or by forcing an ally to accept a missile, would likely cause strain on the relationship to the Kremlin’s advantage.

It should be noted that NATO supports the pull out. This show of solidarity at the highest level of NATO is unsurprising. On the other hand, NATO does not support a new INF range missile in Europe, and no hosts have come forward.

So we must ask, what does the termination of the INF accomplish? The pull out does not bring Russia into compliance, more so it relinquishes power to Russia while diminishing hopes of future diplomacy. It must also be noted that the banned weapons do not provide more capabilities than treaty compliant assets which can be deployed via air or sea. It is clear that this policy move is not just about intermediate-range missiles or insuring the security of allies from Russian weapons – if that were the case Trump would have taken Russia up on visual checks or made further attempts at negotiating the terms of the INF. We must stop assuming that this move is being made to reign in Russia, but realize it as an attempted check on China.

Perhaps this moment is not only a stretch of influence but a flex of power – the America First approach in action. The breaking this deal introduces potential instability to the region in return for balancing China. This termination follows the trend in the Trump presidency of pulling out of huge international agreements and undervaluing multilateral arrangements such as the Transatlantic Partnership, Iran Nuclear Deal, and the Paris Climate Accords.

Only the next six months will tell whether the treaty can at best be truly codified, or at worst be salvaged. Until then we should be watching the moves of Congress. Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR) and nine other senators have now introduced legislation to bar funding for missiles banned in INF dubbed in the Prevention of Arms Race Act.

Megan Horn graduated from Truman State in 2017 and is currently an intern with the Peace Economy Project.